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ABSTRACT
Economic development in the past decades and the increase of cross-
border business by the multinationals coupled with recent financial crisis 
have brought many questions about whether the taxpayers are paying 
their fair share. In order to assess the equitable amount of taxes due, 
revenue authorities often rely on information provided to them by tax-
payers. In conducting their procedures, revenue authorities are in princi-
ple bound by tax secrecy. However, recently, the tax systems have intro-
duced tax policy instruments with opposing effects, intended to provide 
full insight in taxpayers’ revenues worldwide and affect the taxpayers’ 
behaviour towards greater tax compliance. Two such instruments are 
particularly worth noting, public shaming lists, used primarily nationally, 
and international exchange of information, as a cross-border procedure. 
Through comparative legal approach we provide an analysis of legal in-
struments balancing tax confidentiality and tax transparency. As the re-
search will show, the optimal level of tax secrecy, while preserving inter-
national standards of tax transparency, is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to accomplish. Legal tradition of secrecy, implementation of internation-
al standards and the evaluation on the adequacy of such measures should 
all be taken into account before jumping to any conclusions about the 
perfect balance. The goal of accomplishing fair and equitable tax system 
must not be disregarded as well.
Keywords: tax secrecy, tax transparency, public shaming lists, exchange of information
JEL: K34
1 This article is a revised version of the paper entitled ‘Tax Secrecy and Its Limitations: Is There a 
Perfect Balance?’, presented at the EGPA conference, Milano, 30 August–1 September 2017. The 
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1 Introduction
The concepts of secrecy, privacy and transparency are more topical and perti-
nent in contemporary societies than ever before. In taxation, they are related 
to two crucial questions – how revenue authorities administrate taxes and 
whether taxpayers fulfil their tax obligations. While conducting tax proce-
dures, revenue authorities are in principle bound by tax secrecy, a principle 
designed to protect “glass taxpayers” and, consequently, result in greater 
tax revenues by encouraging tax compliance. Recently, tax systems have in-
troduced tax policy instruments with opposing effects, calling for more tax 
transparency, meant to provide full insight in taxpayers’ revenues worldwide 
and affect taxpayers’ behaviour towards greater (voluntary) tax compliance. 
Therefore, the main issue is whether and to what extent should tax informa-
tion and related documents be public or confidential.
Despite the current lively debate on the prevailing concept of gathering and 
disclosing tax information, there is insufficient empirical and theoretical re-
search in this area. There is preliminary evidence that a loss of confidentiality 
increases compliance (Laury & Wallace 2005). Blaufus, Bob and Otto (2014) 
concluded that general public disclosure could result in more, instead of less, 
evasion leading to two possible effects of tax publicity – the shame effect 
and the contagion effect. Perez – Truglia and Troiano (2015) analysed sham-
ing policies as a tool to improve tax debt collection. They demonstrated that 
the optimal policy might be a combination of financial and shaming penalties. 
Schenk-Geers (2009) examines international exchange of information from a 
taxpayers’ viewpoint. Hambre (2015) deals with comparative analysis of tax 
transparency and assesses impacts of tax compliance, administrative costs 
and taxpayer privacy.
Public shaming is in line with the new theories about tax regulation and tax 
compliance which take into account social and personal standards as factors 
influencing a specific type of behaviour. This instrument is used as means of 
deterring aggressive tax planning as well as preventing tax enforcement and 
raising awareness of (voluntary) tax compliance. The comparative analysis 
of countries with the tradition of tax privacy and those strongly adhering to 
tax transparency may lead to opposing conclusions about the usefulness and 
adequacy of this instrument. The international exchange of information has 
been the headline of tax policy debates, and recently the automatic exchange 
of information was introduced as the new global standard. Its main purpose 
is to provide tax administrations with sufficient information to fully meet the 
standard of worldwide taxation and to leave no income untaxed, while avoid-
ing double taxation. Also, the two instruments have been chosen to provide 
insight into national as well as international measures.
The principle method used in this paper is a comparative legal analysis of dif-
ferent approaches to balancing tax confidentiality and tax transparency, try-
ing to identify certain divergences and convergences in the systems selected. 
In this regard, the U.S., Croatian, French, German and Swedish systems were 
selected for the purpose of this paper. Additional factors were taken into 
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consideration when choosing the systems mentioned. One of the factors was 
affiliation with different tax-law families. U.S., French and German systems 
were chosen as leaders influencing tax law in other countries.
The analysis will focus on two main research objectives. Firstly, it aims at de-
fining the key components of tax secrecy model, its development and provide 
examples of best practices of its implementation in selected countries. How-
ever, as lately the use of some tax policy instruments have infringed tax secre-
cy, we examine the influence of shaming lists and exchange of information as 
its opposing tax policy instruments in the aspiration of achieving the ultimate 
goal: the equitable and balanced tax system efficiently providing the highest 
possible level of tax revenues.
2 Tax Secrecy – Main Features and Issues
Tax secrecy is cited as one of the main general tax principles and basic tax-
payers’ rights although its meaning, content and wording is not uniformly 
defined (e.g. European Commission 2016; OECD 2003; Bentley 2007). Tradi-
tionally, the principle of tax secrecy was introduced to encourage taxpayers’ 
participation in tax procedures. It was believed that taxpayers would be more 
comfortable with the idea of cooperation and disclosure of all facts if they be-
lieve in the discretion of tax officials, i.e. this would foster (voluntary) tax com-
pliance and serve as a sort of counterbalance to tax administrations’ (broader 
and broader) powers in collecting tax information. Generally, the concept of 
tax secrecy confronts often opposite interests of taxpayers on the one side 
and revenue authorities on the other.
When we summarise its various definitions, three common elements could 
be identified: (i) tax administrations2 should protect taxpayers’ private infor-
mation, as well as all other information about a particular taxpayer that be-
comes available to them during tax procedures, from unauthorised use and 
disclosure; (ii) exceptions from tax secrecy (i.e. cases which do not constitute 
violation of the tax secrecy principle) should be specified in tax regulations; 
and (iii) disciplinary accountability and/or criminal liability is held against those 
(tax) officials who breach tax secrecy and misuse protected information.
Over the past few decades the area of tax secrecy has been very dynamic. 
Undoubtedly, main challenges faced by contemporary tax administrations – 
voluntary tax compliance, fighting tax avoidance among others – prompted 
some sort of review of the role and meaning of tax secrecy in contemporary 
tax systems. Keeping that in mind, tax secrecy has become an issue in national 
as well as in international tax law. In a national environment, the question of 
the influence of tax secrecy on (voluntary) tax compliance was (partly) pro-
voked by the emergence of the concept of paying taxes as a “civic virtue” that 
particularly gained importance towards the end of the 20th century, also in 
2 And all other official persons involved in tax procedures, e.g. different experts engaged by 
revenue authorities.
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the context of ensuing theoretical (r)evolution.3 Questions have been raised 
as to whether (at all) and if so, to what extent tax secrecy could be used in 
ways “that do not only evoke deterrence but rather create trust and promote 
social norms” (Hambre 2015, p. 63) or whether it is time to replace it with the 
opposite concept of tax transparency.
Another challenge for revenue authorities has emerged recently through 
rapid development of tax information exchange instrument. Although the 
exchange of information has been in used since 19th century (Oberson 2015, 
p. 4), and it has been a standard part of tax treaties worldwide, in the past 
decade this instrument has been much discussed by the tax law community. In 
tackling aggressive tax planning, harmful tax regimes and tax evasion, often 
caused by lack of information, countries can engage in tighter cooperation 
to increase the amount of information at their disposal (Remeur 2015, p. 16). 
The development of the exchange of information, and in particular, recent 
rapid acceptance of automatic exchange of information as the new global 
standard has brought about the issues of breaches of confidentiality, priva-
cy, secrecy and abuse of data exchanged to the highlight of global tax policy 
agenda (Oberson 2015, p. 209).
Recently, in 2016, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has 
been adopted and will come into effect on 25 May 2018, replacing the EU 
Data Protection Directive. The GDPR is a regulation, binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in the EU member states. Briefly, GDPR represents a 
major change in the protection of (taxpayers’) personal data as it provides for 
a stronger protection of individuals’ privacy, imposes increased obligations on 
legal entities regarding collection and processing of personal data and intro-
duces significant penalties for breaking the rules. GDPR considers protection 
of personal data as legislative objective, a part of fundamental freedoms and 
rights, unlike the Directive which only refers to the right to privacy instead 
(Huang, 2018, p. 237). This development has put the matters of data protec-
tion high on the public policy agenda, especially as it relates to the sensitive 
taxpayer information and revenue authorities among other institutions are 
subject to its provisions. In a more general sense it seems that this normative 
development could be seen as a way of balancing current trends towards tax 
transparency with the protection of “glass” taxpayers.
2.1 Comparative Models
Based on the comparative analysis, heterogeneity of the models can be ob-
served when it comes to a legal approach to disclosing taxpayers’ informa-
tion. In general, three models regarding its main rule and starting point can be 
identified: (i) an “unlimited” model of tax secrecy; (ii) a hybrid or limited model 
of tax secrecy; and (iii) a tax transparency model.
(i) The most prominent representative of the first model is the German one. 
It is described as a model strongly adhering to tax secrecy – unlike other mod-
3 New theories of (tax) regulation and tax compliance have been emerging. They primarily seek 
to understand, explain and even predict taxpayers’ behaviour in relation to government.
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els, tax secrecy has a constitutional origin and base (see also Valta 2013).4 Ac-
cording to the Fiscal Code of Germany (Abgabenordnung, hereinafter AO), all 
information and circumstances of a third person which have become known 
to tax officials (and other persons of equivalent status to public officials) in 
tax-related procedures are protected by the institute of tax secrecy. It does 
not matter whether this information is tax relevant - tax secrecy refers to all 
personal, economic, public or private relationships of a certain, legal or natu-
ral, person.
(ii) The second model is considered a hybrid or rather a limited model of tax 
secrecy. The secrecy principle prevails, however, it implies a certain degree 
of “tax publicity.” The French, U.S. and Croatian models could be included in 
this group. In the French model, tax secrecy is, similar to the German model, 
seen as a mechanism of taxpayers’ privacy protection, however with certain 
limitations. Therefore, unlike Germany, tax secrecy in this model has no con-
stitutional origin although it is declared by the Taxpayers’ Charter as a value. 
It is understood as “professional” secrecy (sections L. 103. – L. 167. A LPF5) and 
the obligation to keep it, under the provisions of the Criminal Code6, applies 
to all persons involved in various procedures related to taxes and other pub-
lic duties7 and concerns all information collected in the course of these pro-
cedures. However, it seems that the professional secrecy obligation for tax 
officials is understood and regulated more stringently than for other public 
officials (Dubut 2013, p. 417). The professional secrecy obligation and pro-
tection of taxpayers’ private lives are especially emphasised in the tax audit 
procedure (section L. 103 subsection 2 LPF). The rules on professional secrecy 
also include rules for the delivery of documents to taxpayers (section L. 104 
- L. 111 LPF). Regarding tax secrecy “limitations”, two such groups of cases 
can be identified. The first one is covered by the term “public interest” and 
the second group of “limitations” concerns “tax publicity” (section L. 111 LPF). 
When it comes to the principle of tax secrecy in the United States, a number 
of main issues could be mentioned. First of all, the question of confidentiality 
in tax matters includes the question of tax return publicity and public access 
to those documents. American history has known alternations of different 
periods of legal regulation of this matter that were followed or preceded by 
lively (public) debates between advocates of tax privacy, on the one hand, 
and advocates of tax transparency, on the other hand. One of the main rea-
sons for the mentioned debate, as well as for different regulation of tax con-
fidentiality through history, is its influence on voluntary tax compliance. Both 
sides have been using the same argument, i.e. that the prevailing concept of 
tax privacy or tax transparency would have a significant role in encouraging 
voluntary tax compliance and preventing tax evasion, however supporting 
it with different explanations. Advocates of tax privacy highlighted that tax 
returns contain a large quantity of private and sensitive information. There-
4 The base is a constitutional right to informational self-determination. 
5 Livre des procédures fiscales (The Law on Tax Procedures).
6 It sanctions all violations of professional secrecy. The sanctions provided are monetary fines 
and one-year imprisonment. 
7 Meaning tax assessment, tax audit, tax collection etc. 
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fore, taxpayers would be (more) compliant if they believed in the revenue 
authorities’ honesty and discretion. Advocates of tax transparency emphasise 
a possible influence of tax transparency on the change of otherwise private 
and/or hidden behaviour as the main argument, using this concept as a kind 
of supervision. They believe that, among others, public access to tax returns 
and tax information “would shame the affluent into heightened compliance 
with their tax obligations” (Harrison in Schwartz, 2008, p. 891). As new theo-
ries on tax compliance and tax regulation have been emerging, the debate 
has been continuing especially “when government seeks innovative ways to 
address tax gap” (Blank 2013, p. 1).
The year 1976 was somewhat of a milestone in legal regulation since the Tax 
Reform Act, for the first time, “enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
regulating the use and disclosure of tax returns and tax return information” 
(Department of the Treasury 2000, p. 22). The four main rules established 
then have remained in force until today. The general rule is that returns and 
return information are confidential and, except as authorised in the Code, 
may not be disclosed by an officer or employee of the United States, or an of-
ficer or employee or any State or other person who has had access to returns 
or return information (s. 26 United States Code, section 6103).8 Exceptions 
from general tax confidentiality, although thoroughly prescribed, are actually 
numerous and, for the most part, could be justified on the grounds of public 
interest as well as potential new threats (e.g. terrorism).
The role model for the Croatian tax secrecy regime was the German mod-
el,9 which is especially visible in the fact that it has a constitutional origin. 
However, unlike Germany, certain features of the Croatian model were reg-
ulated very vaguely from the beginning. This refers to the exact meaning of 
“unauthorised use or disclosure” (as opposed to a very detailed explanation 
of the concept in German tax law) or the definition of what type of informa-
tion is covered by tax secrecy (e.g. tax relevant or not). With time, the main 
legal scheme has changed in two directions: (1) expanding cases that do not 
constitute a violation of tax secrecy and (2) introducing tax publicity, namely 
shaming lists, which brought the Croatian model into this group. Although 
cases where the obligation of tax secrecy is not violated are not numerous 
and mainly include standard solutions (a written consent of the persons con-
cerned) or could be justified on the grounds of administrative efficiency (e.g. 
cooperation with other public bodies, or administrative cooperation in the 
field of taxes), some of these cases are prescribed very generally.10
(iii) Probably the most “open” system among the systems analysed here is 
the Swedish model since its “starting point” is considerably different. The law 
governing the Swedish tax secrecy model is the Public Access to Information 
8 The taxpayer’s right to confidentiality is also guaranteed by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 
adopted in 2014.
9 The same holds true for tax law in general, bearing in mind that the Croatian tax system is 
quite young due to the socialist system existing until 1990. 
10 E.g. if the data are disclosed for the purpose of tax enforcement procedures (section 8 
subsection 5 number 5 General Tax Code), which might actually be a number of cases.
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and Secrecy Act (hereinafter PAISA) enacted in 2009. The principle of pub-
lic access to information means that the public and mass media are entitled 
to receive information on state and municipal activities. It comprises, among 
others, access to official documents; freedom of expression for officials and 
others; right to communicate and publish information (Ministry of Justice 
2009, p. 7). The Act also includes provisions on secrecy which entail “restric-
tions both on the right of the public to obtain official documents (…) and 
on the right of public functionaries to freedom of expression” (Ministry of 
Justice 2009, p. 7), hence it regulates tax secrecy (Chapter 27). The basis for 
those rules is constitutional law, the Freedom of the Press Act (FPA), which 
provides for the right of public access to official documents and its possible 
restrictions (Hambre 2015, p. 165). The main rule in PAISA is that “full secrecy 
applies to all work within the tax authority that relates to establishing taxes 
to be paid by individuals and companies while the tax decisions are normally 
public” (Nergelius 2017, p. 3). In other words, secrecy does not protect the 
tax return as a document but protects from disclosing the information within 
(Hambre 2015, p. 166). As tax secrecy provisions do not lay down any spe-
cial requirements for the applicability of secrecy, we talk about “absolute” 
secrecy. However, decisions of tax courts and public decisions are another 
case characterised by “high level of transparency” (Hambre 2015, p. 166). 
When it comes to tax court proceedings, the secrecy provision here will apply 
under certain conditions known as the “requirement of damage” which, in 
general, could be straight or reverse. Therefore, when it comes to taxpayer 
information in court proceedings, transparency is presumed but the informa-
tion may be kept secret if it is concluded that disclosure would cause damage 
to the individual in question (Hambre 2015, p. 166). Even a higher level of 
transparency is provided for in relation to tax decisions since tax decisions are 
normally public, according to the PAISA (Chapter 27, Article 6), (Kristofferson, 
Persson, Nergelius, Valguarnera, Hambre, Larsson, 2013, p. 1079). The law 
enumerates decisions that are considered to be secret (e.g. decisions on dis-
missal, advance rulings). Kristoffersson et al. (2013) emphasise that not only 
tax decisions are public but also the grounds for the decisions, which leaves 
room for public insight and some sort of public “surveillance” of the revenue 
authorities’ work and performance. Although tax secrecy (or transparency) in 
Sweden is not directly related to tax compliance, as is the case in the U.S., such 
a model of “targeted tax transparency” (or better to say “tax secrecy”) might 
have benefits for voluntary tax compliance, especially in terms of enhancing 
the procedural and retributional fairness of the tax system. On the other 
hand, it is admitted that it raises serious questions concerning the protection 
of the taxpayer’s privacy (Hambre, 2015; Nergelius, 2017), which also might 
hinder voluntary tax compliance. However, in this regard, Nergelius (2017, p. 
3) conclusion may be very illustrative: “Perhaps this kind of publicity does not 
exist in so many other countries, but so far, Swedish people have been able to 
live with it”. Moreover, this observation might also explain the small number 
of individual complaints related to this issue.
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3 Tax Secrecy Limitations
Analysis in the previous paragraphs has revealed certain exceptions from the 
tax secrecy rule. Three such exceptions could be identified. First, a number of 
derogations could be gathered under the umbrella term of “public interest.” 
The second one covers tax publicity. The third one concerns exchange of in-
formation – one of the vehicles of combatting tax evasion.
3.1 Public Interest
Public interest is generally considered the “Achilles’ heel” of the tax secre-
cy model (Lang in: Tipke, Lang 2010) creating a kind of a “gap” between the 
declarative and real meaning of the institute. In the German model, the Code 
stipulates cases in which disclosure (but not use) of obtained information is 
permissible (section 30, subsection 4 AO). One of the most controversial pro-
visions here is “compelling public interest for such disclosure” (subsection 4 
number 5 AO). Analysing the legal wording, it seems that “compelling public 
interest” is a rather imprecise and vague legal term leaving room for theolog-
ical and “case by case” interpretation as well as “prone to disproportionate 
use” (Valta 2013, p. 457). It should also be added that revenue authorities in 
the cases specified in subsection 4 are (generally) authorised, but not obliged 
to disclose relevant information. Thus, they can use discretion in cases where 
they should primarily take into account the purpose of the given authorisation 
and (existing) statutory restrictions (section 5 AO). However, in certain cas-
es, revenue authorities are obliged to disclose relevant information (section 
31, 31a, 31b AO). Those cases concern, for instance, disclosure to public-law 
entities, statutory social insurance institutions, disclosure for the purpose of 
countering unlawful employment or money laundering; in other words, there 
is (again) a strong public interest and “common good” behind them, giving 
prominence to the “fiscal role” of revenue authorities. The term “common 
good” is also used as ‘justification’ for sections 93 (subsections 7 and 8) and 
93b AO, which regulate automated access to the data. Although those provi-
sions raise a number of issues, the Federal Constitutional Court has declared 
that they are in conformity with the Constitution, on the grounds of serving 
the “common good.” However, the Court held that these provisions need to 
be more precise and clear. It seems that (higher) nomotechnical standards 
are the only possible way for increasing legal certainty and protecting taxpay-
ers. Very similar situation is in other countries. In the French model, the term 
“public interest” also serves as a justification for a number of derogations 
from the professional secrecy rule regulated in sections L. 113 - L. 167. A LPF. 
The law itself divides these derogations into seven groups on the grounds of 
main beneficiaries, e.g. derogations in cases of international fiscal assistance; 
derogations in cases of benefit for certain administrative bodies, public au-
thorities, local authorities, public bodies; derogations in cases of benefits for 
various commissions etc. In Croatia, cases where the obligation of tax secrecy 
is not violated are not numerous and mainly include standard solutions (a writ-
ten consent of the persons concerned) or could be justified on the grounds 
of administrative efficiency (e.g. cooperation with other public bodies, or ad-
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ministrative cooperation in the field of taxes). However, some of these cases 
are prescribed very generally.11
3.2 Tax Publicity
For the purposes of this article, tax publicity could be defined as a framework 
in which tax authorities disclose and publicise tax information, (mainly) with 
the purpose of improving fiscal “discipline,” reinforcing (social) values and 
thus supporting and increasing (voluntary) tax compliance. Such a framework 
aims to provoke shame in (delinquent) taxpayers as well as to strengthen pub-
lic disapproval of and pressure on non-compliant behaviour. In that context, 
it is used primarily in two areas: as an additional tool in tax enforcement area 
and/or as a measure of fight against tax avoidance and tax evasion. This in-
cludes various stigma policies, e.g. publicising tax debtors’ names. Therefore, 
they are also called “shaming penalties”. However, little is known, especially 
in terms of empirical evidence, about the real effect of these shaming lists on 
reducing tax delinquency (Perez-Truglia, 2015). It could even have an oppo-
site, contagious effect, due to possibility of taxpayers´ conditional coopera-
tion, i.e. they will not comply with their obligations if they perceive that other 
taxpayers do not comply too (Blaufus, Bob, Otto, 2014). Another issue is what 
kind of (delinquent) taxpayers would actually be the best target for the tax 
publicity model? It is hard(er) to believe that shame and paying-taxes-as-civ-
ic-virtue policies would have influence on those taxpayers who are generally 
more prone to (aggressive) avoidance of their tax obligations (Rogić Lugarić 
2015; Perez Truglia & Torano 2015).
The concept of tax publicity is applied in three systems analysed here – the 
U.S., Croatian and French – however, as we will see, the concept has differ-
ent meanings in these systems. In France, tax publicity, introduced in 1984, 
means that there are lists of taxpayers of income and corporate tax, which 
are kept by the local administration. These lists are, under certain conditions, 
accessible to all taxpayers residing in the municipality (CGI, section L. 111). 
For taxpayers of income tax, it contains information on the number of family 
members, taxable income and the amount of income tax. These lists also con-
tain information about persons who are not taxpayers but are resident in the 
municipality. Disclosure of any information contained in the lists is forbidden 
and punishable with a fine equal to the amount of taxes divulged (CGI, arti-
cle 1762). Introduction of the lists was harshly criticised; the main argument 
being the possibility of their misuse and that they do not comply with the 
principle of protecting individual privacy and security. However, as Sid Ahmed 
(2007, p. 233) put it, the State Council did not respond precisely to that issue 
and therefore a chance for a debate on the real meaning and place of tax 
secrecy in French law has been missed. In Croatia, tax publicity in the form of 
making public a list of tax debtors or a shaming list was introduced in 2012 
(General Tax Act, Article 8, Subsections 7-9). The shaming list comprises a list 
of taxpayers who owe the state specific amounts of unpaid taxes specified 
11 E.g. if the data are disclosed for the purpose of tax enforcement procedures (section 8 sub-
section 5 number 5 General Tax Code), which might actually be a number of cases.
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by law12; the threshold of tax debt determining the place on the list varies 
depending on whether the taxpayer is a natural or a legal person.13 The list 
can be found on the revenue authority’s website and includes the taxpayer’s 
name and surname, year of birth, place of residence and the amount of his 
tax debt. If a person requesting information proves his legal interest, revenue 
authorities may add other information necessary for establishing the taxpay-
er’s identity as well as disclose information on measures taken for tax recov-
ery procedure. However, it does not contain information on the taxpayers 
whose tax debts are deferred or the taxpayers who reached an agreement 
on tax payment with revenue authorities. The list was supposed to be updat-
ed every three months. According to preparatory work, the main goal of the 
tax debtor list was to promote financial discipline, improve revenue authori-
ties’ efficiency in the area of tax enforcement, and raise society’s awareness 
about the importance of voluntary tax compliance. It is worth noting that the 
introduction of the shaming list in the Croatian system in 2012 represents 
a significant shift considering tax confidentiality legislation in force before 
this amendment. The severity of the legislative changes is visible in the fact 
that a tax debtor listed was not notified, prior to publication, of the revenue 
authorities’ intention to include their name on the list (or at least there is no 
such legal obligation or practice). However, the Croatian solution seemed too 
“ambitious” from the beginning, bearing in mind its main features and goals. 
Actually, this fact might be one of the main reasons for its “failure” (s. Rogić 
Lugarić 2015). It was not quite clear whether tax secrecy should be more in the 
service of reinforcing social norms or a deterrent instrument preventing tax 
avoidance. And if we analyse the legal wording of the concept of tax secrecy 
on the whole (especially its above mentioned exception), the latter solution 
seems more probable. However, the question is whether this sole instrument 
is sufficient, especially bearing in mind a lack of other, complementary tax law 
instruments in the Croatian system that would “send out the same message” 
(e.g. general anti-avoidance rule). The latest data indicate a questionable suc-
cess of the shaming list – interest in tax publicity has fallen sharply over the 
past few years (measured by the number of “clicks”).
In the U.S. system, as mentioned, the use of shaming lists is generally not rec-
ommended as its (unwarranted) consequences may undermine taxpayers’ 
confidence in the tax system. However, there is a practice of publicising tax 
debtors’ names at the state level. Almost half of the states use this policy 
(Perez-Truglia, 2015; Blank, 2013) namely Maryland, Vermont14 New York15, 
Colorado16, South Carolina, Oregon17, New Jersey, North Carolina.18 When it 
12 E.g. value added tax, income tax, corporate tax etc. Local taxes are not included. 
13 For legal persons, tax debts should exceed 300,000 Croatian Kuna (approximately 40,000 Eu-
ros); for natural persons pursing self-employed activity tax debts should exceed 100,000 Kuna 
(approximately 10,000 Euros) and for all the other taxpayers tax debts should exceed 15,000 
Kuna (approximately 2,000 Euros). 
14 <http://tax.vermont.gov/research-and-reports/reports/delinquent-taxpayer-report>.
15 <https://www.tax.ny.gov/enforcement/warrants.htm>.
16 <https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/tax/delinquent-taxpayers-lists>.
17 <http://gov.oregonlive.com/taxes/delinquents/>.
18 <http://www.dor.state.nc.us/collect/QryMostWanted.pdf>.
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comes to these lists, certain common features can be observed. Most of them 
contain basic data – name and surname, the amount of the tax debt, the type 
of taxes. Furthermore, as a rule, tax debtors included on the list are notified 
by revenue authorities in advance about the intention to include their name in 
the list and are given the opportunity to settle their debt or resolve outstand-
ing debts prior to listing. This policy is fully in line with theoretical suggestions 
(Posner, 2000). Perez-Truglia & Torano´s field experiment in three US states 
showed that shaming penalties can increase tax revenues, but their desirabil-
ity remained unclear from a social welfare perspective (Perez-Truglia, 2015). 
Other interesting findings are related to the limits of peer pressure – the ef-
fect of the shaming penalty was significant for individuals who owed smaller 
amounts than for those with higher debts.
3.3 Exchange of Information
The “big bang” of 2009 (Oberson 2015, p. 8) has marked the beginning of 
the new era in the notion of tax information secrecy and the start of the shift 
towards tax transparency of taxpayers’ cross-border income. In tackling ag-
gressive tax planning, harmful tax regimes and tax evasion, often caused by 
lack of information, countries can engage in tighter cooperation to increase 
the amount of information at their disposal. (Remeur 2015, p. 16) The in-
creased flow of information brings some challenges regarding the protection 
of taxpayers’ rights. (Debelva & Mosquera 2017, p. 362) During the tax pro-
cedure, taxpayers are obliged to report, determine, compute and pay taxes. 
The globalization, and its consequence in tax procedure – the exchange of 
information, caused additional increase of their duties. As antipode to their 
obligations, taxpayers are also protected by rights, either through domestic 
legislation or internationally. Taxpayers’ rights guarantee fair process in the 
exchange of information, privacy protection in the transfer of data and pro-
cedural rights. However, the scope of these rights differs dependant on the 
legal instruments on which the information exchange is based as well as the 
national legislation. The development of the exchange of information, and 
in particular, recent rapid acceptance of automatic exchange of information 
as the new global standard has brought about the issues of breaches of con-
fidentiality, privacy, secrecy and abuse of data exchanged to the highlight of 
global tax policy agenda. (Oberson 2015, p. 209)
Transparency, according to Remeur (2015, p. 10) undermines tax avoidance 
schemes used by multinational companies via tax planning strategies, hence 
avoiding paying their fair share in taxes. Zucman (2015, p. 47) estimates that 
losses in fiscal revenues due to the existence of tax havens amount to about 
USD 200 billion each year. The assessment that 10%-20% of national tax rev-
enues in developing countries comes from international tax transaction only 
adds to the significance of greater transparency (Campbell & Comer Jones 
2014, p.37). However, does this affect the tax secrecy? Is tax secrecy incom-
patible with tax transparency from a policy perspective (Barrios Altafulla, 
2014, p. 425)?
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Tax transparency and confidentiality are not mutually excluding (Remeur 
2015, p. 1). The main question is how to achieve the balance between the 
right to know and the limits to this right. The good example, according to the 
author, is French Tax Procedure Act, which justifies exceptions with the pub-
lic interest and stipulates international exchange of information as exception 
to the rule of secrecy. Another example can be found in Croatian legislation, 
where the General Tax Act stipulates international cooperation (i.e. exchange 
of information) as the case where tax secrecy remains unharmed. Taking into 
account all issues mentioned above, it might be more appropriate to address 
the issue of tax secrecy in information exchange procedures by analysing the 
achieved level of tax transparency, as in fact the two represent two sides of 
the same coin.
Exchange of information mostly occurs in three main forms: spontaneous, on 
request or automatic (Oberson 2015, p. 27). Information is exchanged on the 
basis of the legal instrument which provides legal basis for the exchange. Al-
though there are many instruments based on which the tax relevant informa-
tion is exchanged, the secrecy and transparency provisions of OECD Model, 
FATCA and CRS will be analysed in more details below. However, it is notewor-
thy to mention that international agreements do not offer specific protection 
of taxpayers’ rights in that regard, so it remains on the domestic law to deal 
with this issue (Barrios Altafulla 2014, p. 426).
3.3.1	 OECD	Model	and	Confidentiality	Provisions
The provisions on the exchange of information are set out by the Article 26 
of the OECD Model and contain conditions and safeguards regarding secrecy 
and the use of data. According to the 2014 Model19 the foreseeably relevant 
information which is exchanged must be treated as secret, applying the same 
rules as for the information obtained under domestic laws of the receiving 
state. The information may be disclosed only to persons or authorities deal-
ing with the collection of taxes and prosecution in respect of taxes and those 
persons may use the information only for such purposes (OECD 2014a, p. 40). 
Such provision on confidentiality represents only relative duty of secrecy. 
The information should only be secret as is the information obtained under 
domestic laws of the requesting state (Debelva & Mosquera 2017, p. 369). 
Schenk-Geers (2009, p. 134) finds that states in fighting tax fraud must be 
able to exchange confidential documents and still recognize tax secrecy as an 
essential determinant of constitutional state in relation to taxpayers. After 
transmitting information to requesting state, the supplying state is no longer 
in the position to fulfil its constitutional obligation – hence the obligation of 
secrecy is transferred to the receiving state.
The original OECD Model concept contained an absolute duty of confidenti-
ality, requiring that the information exchanged to be treated secretly and not 
be disclosed to any person or authority other than those concerned with the 
assessment or collection of taxes which are subject to the Convention (De-
19 The 2017 amendments to the OECD Model did not relate to the Article 26.
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belva & Mosquera 2017, p. 369). The 1977 and 2005 versions of OECD Mod-
el Convention brought further amendments to Article 26. The article refers 
to the secrecy legislation of the receiving state, it extends the persons and 
authorities entitled to access information. The information use was widened 
and it became possible to disclose them in court hearings, case law and crim-
inal proceedings (Oberson 2015, p. 26). Schenk-Geers (2009, p. 140) empha-
sizes the supremacy of treaty provisions over domestic tax secrecy provisions. 
Therefore, even if so provided by national legislation, the disclosure of infor-
mation to other persons than those listed in Article 26 is forbidden. However, 
the maintenance of secrecy and sanctions for not abiding to those rules is a 
matter of domestic law of the receiving state (Oberson 2015, p. 25).
A similar secrecy clause is contained in the Tax Information Exchange Agree-
ments (TIEA), developed by the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Ex-
change of Information with the purpose of exchanging information between 
OECD and other countries with tax havens regarding their residents’ offshore 
activities. The information exchanged must be treated as confidential and 
disclosed only to persons or authorities dealing with the assessment or col-
lection of taxes, enforcement, prosecution or appeals in relation to taxes cov-
ered by agreement. Confidentiality is an autonomous concept as it does not 
refer to the law of the requesting state. Additionally, the information may 
only be exchanged regarding taxes covered by the agreement and it does not 
include supervision authorities (Oberson 2015, p. 63).
3.3.2 FATCA and CRS – New Standards of Automatic Exchange 
of Information
The recent developments in tax transparency have brought about the su-
premacy of automatic exchange of information over other forms of exchange. 
Firstly, the specific system was developed by the US with the intention to 
leave no US taxpayers untaxed. The OECD’s work followed, and lead to the 
broadly accepted new standard in automatic exchange of information – the 
Common Reporting Standard.
The US have a taxing system based on both citizenship and residence as 
grounds for imposing income tax. The citizenship-based taxation regime al-
lows the US tax authorities to tax all US citizens and US resident aliens on 
worldwide income, not taking into account their residence. (Holm 2014, 
p. 454) The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), passed in 2010, 
represents the framework for reciprocal financial information exchange be-
tween the United States and other countries. Its aim is to supress offshore 
tax evasion and increase federal tax revenues. In the FATCA system, the tax-
payers are required to report their international bank accounts (i.e. balances, 
receipts and withdrawals). Foreign financial institutions are obliged to report 
information about their U.S. clients (about taxpayer accounts and foreign 
entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold substantial ownership) to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). As direct reporting to the IRS has raised legal issues for 
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some countries, IGAs (intergovernmental agreements) have been developed 
(Campbell & Comer Jones 2014, p. 33).20
FATCA requires US withholding agents to withhold tax on certain payments 
to foreign financial institutions (FFIs) which do not comply with the reporting 
obligation to the IRS about their US accounts and payments to non-financial 
foreign entities (NFFEs) which do not provide information about their US own-
ers to withholding agents (Gupta 2013, p. 226). FATCA’s extraterritorial effect 
consists of the obligation of FFIs to enter into agreement with the IRS and to 
report either to the US IRS or tax authorities in their respective countries, in 
case that the country has signed an IGA with the US, about the US investors 
and account holders and non-financial foreign entity investors with substan-
tial US owners (Gupta 2013, pp. 227–228). In case that the FFI does not report, 
any US payer must withhold 30% of payment made to FFI (Holm 2014, p. 462).
Both IGA and Competent Authority Agreement (CAA), the documents nec-
essary for the implementation of FATCA, draw upon the 1988 Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, allowing automatic ex-
change of information. The IGA21 and CAA22 contain provisions on confiden-
tiality, data safeguards and limits to the use of the data. They refer to the 
corresponding provisions of the Convention and provide for no specific rules 
in that regard.
The Article 22 of the Convention sets out that information obtained under 
the Convention must be treated as secret and protected in the same manner 
as information obtained under the domestic law of requesting state, ensuring 
the protection of personal data, in accordance with the safeguards specified 
by the domestic law of supplying state. Such information may be disclosed 
only to persons or authorities conducting the assessment, collection or recov-
ery of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of 
appeals in relation to, taxes of that state, or the oversight of those processes. 
After the introduction of FATCA, the OECD and G20 worked on developing 
a single global standard of automatic financial information exchange which 
resulted in Model Competent Authority Agreement and the Common Report-
ing Standard. (Hey & Heilmeier 2016, p. 242)
The OECD’s Global Standard is based on two components – the Model Com-
petent Authority Agreement (CAA), a legal instrument providing for the au-
tomatic exchange of information between countries, and the Common Re-
porting Standard (CRS), which sets out requirements for reporting and due 
diligence regarding specific categories of financial accounts. CAA links CRS 
20 Model 1 IGA is the only reciprocal model and it has been used as a template for the OECD’s 
global standard for exchange of information. Model 2 was drafted for countries with strong 
tradition of privacy and banking secrecy (Somare & Wöhrer 2014, pp. 396–397).
21 E.g. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government 
of the United States of America to improve international tax compliance and to implement 
FATCA, Official gazette No. 5/2016.
22 E.g. CAA between the competent authorities of the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of Croatia, available at <https://www.porezna-uprava.hr/Dokumenti vijesti/FATCA Agree-
ment_20032015.pdf>.
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with the legal basis for exchange of information between countries (Gadžo & 
Klemenčić 2017, p. 215). The CRS provides financial firms with the template 
for due diligence, definitions, identification of foreign account holders and 
foreign controlling persons, to enable preparation for the exchange. On the 
other hand, Model CAA provides the governments with the legal basis, i.e. the 
framework for competent authority agreements. (McGill 2016, p. 2)
The obligation of participating jurisdictions is to annually exchange informa-
tion they obtained from financial institutions with other competent authori-
ties on an automatic basis. Unlike FATCA, there are no withholding sanctions 
for non-participating entities, but on the other hand, there is a monitoring 
mechanism entrusted with the Global Forum (Radcliffe 2014, p. 162; Oberson 
2015, pp. 199–201). OECD (2014c, p. 13) suggested establishing automatic 
exchange relationship based on a multilateral instrument, such as the Multi-
lateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The 
CRS requirements need to be implemented into the national legislations of 
participating jurisdictions. (Gadžo & Klemenčić 2017, p. 217)
In accordance with the Model Competent Agreement, rules on confidentiality 
and the proper use of information will be based on a corresponding instru-
ment which allows automatic exchange of information (Multilateral Conven-
tion or a bilateral tax treaty) containing provisions on the confidentiality of in-
formation exchanged and limiting the scope of persons entitled to access the 
information as well as the purpose for which the information may be used. 
(OECD 2014c, p. 13) Prior to entering into automatic information exchange 
agreement with another jurisdiction, the receiving jurisdiction must have le-
gal framework and administrative capacity and processes in place which en-
sure confidentiality of information received and the use of information only 
for specified purposes (OECD 2014b, p. 8).
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis in the article brings several conclusions. The systems analysed 
have been converging with respect to two facts: special treatment of tax in-
formation, and its exceptions. It seems that there is (general) recognition that 
tax information can be very sensitive and that personal information and its 
special treatment is secured by the legal institute of tax secrecy. However, the 
exact position of this institute depends on the overall approach and under-
standing of the role of (tax) information. It might be (primarily) understood 
as an essential element of protection of taxpayers’ private lives or as means 
of monitoring the public authorities’ work and performance. Therefore, as we 
have seen, tax secrecy might function as a rule (in the U.S., Croatian, French 
and German systems) or as an exception (the Swedish system). Where tax se-
crecy functions as a rule, which is still a prevailing concept, tax information 
is secret per se; exceptions are thoroughly prescribed by law and should be 
interpreted very strictly. Differences in the extent of tax secrecy can also be 
observed: while in certain systems tax secrecy concerns the framework for 
revenue authorities’ use and disclosure of tax information when conducting 
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tax procedures, in other systems it also concerns the secrecy of tax return or 
is even part of a broader framework that also includes access to public docu-
ments. Historical, as well as broader social context, determinants are obvious. 
Another common feature is its, direct or indirect, influence on tax compli-
ance. Direct influence is especially emphasised in the U.S. and German sys-
tems where tax secrecy is considered an important standard/principle in tax 
procedures, whose aim is to create a climate of confidence and trust between 
revenue authorities and taxpayers and thus support and encourage taxpay-
ers’ cooperation and voluntary tax compliance. In the Swedish case, a bal-
ance between tax secrecy and tax transparency seems to have the same role. 
Therefore, in the U.S., German and Swedish systems, tax confidentiality (and 
tax transparency) legislation is rather designed with the purpose of nurturing 
trust in the system and enhancing communication between the parties and 
thus it is closer to the so-called norm-based compliance model. In the Croatian 
system, however, the key role in influencing voluntary tax compliance is given 
to tax secrecy exceptions, where a deterrent effect is emphasised.
Tax secrecy has a double role – it functions as one of the main taxpayers’ rights 
but also as the revenue authorities’ tool when administering taxes, which was 
actually one of its first roles. The latter feature is especially visible in its ex-
ceptions. We identified three main exceptions: public interest (and common 
welfare); (strategic) tax publicity; exchange of information. As we have seen, 
a number of derogations in all the systems analysed could be justified on the 
grounds of public interest. Their primary intention is to facilitate revenue au-
thorities’ work and increase their efficiency in tax procedures as well as sup-
port their fiscal role. Two other exceptions, however, have additional goals.
Tax publicity is an instrument having a strong behavioural-change dimension 
and multiple goals. Although its implementation has recently become quite 
popular, there is no firm empirical evidence about its real effects. As we have 
seen in our analysis, it has different meanings. In the French system, its role 
is not quite clear. It is possible that it rather undermines the meaning of tax 
secrecy within a system promoting certain taxpayers’ behaviour or serving as 
a “monitoring” tool. In the Croatian and U.S. systems, tax publicity is primarily 
seen as an instrument of deterrence but it might end up producing different 
results. While empirical research in the U.S. environment shows certain posi-
tive effects of this measure, it seems that in the Croatian system this measure 
has not met desired expectations. It is worth noting that the introduction of 
the shaming list in the Croatian system in 2012 represents a significant shift 
considering tax confidentiality legislation in force before this amendment. It 
would be very interesting to explore whether this measure in Croatia has ac-
tually produced the contagion effect.
The international aspect of tax secrecy, or more accurately tax transparency, 
relates to the exchange of information. To properly determine tax liabilities 
and achieve equality in taxation countries must rely, apart on national pro-
cedures of collecting information, also on international cooperation and as-
sistance. In those procedures, sensitive financial taxpayers’ information is no 
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longer protected by the tax secrecy rules of one country, but is entrusted to 
other countries under confidentiality framework of international agreements 
and their own tax legislation. Due to the recent development of automatic 
information exchange, new concerns have surfaced, stressing the importance 
of keeping the information secret and prescribing purposes and persons au-
thorized to us it. Although the information leaves the oversight and the pro-
tection of one revenue authority, its use by another authority must not jeop-
ardize the confidentiality thereof.
So, to conclude, is there a balance of tax secrecy and its limitations? We would 
say that there is no perfect balance but obviously every legal system struggles 
to getting closer to this goal. However, in order to provide a more elaborate 
response to this question, one must dig deeper and take into consideration 
specific features of legal instruments and their implementation in countries 
with various traditions and legal concepts. Even recent normative develop-
ments have pointed out the everlasting search for this perfect balance.
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